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ABSTRACT
In its 2020 regular session, Virginia's General Assembly debated whether
to send to Virginians a constitutional amendment that transfers the General
Assembly’s redistricting responsibility to a newly created Virginia Redistricting Commission (VRC). The VRC is a bipartisan commission of legislators and citizens that will redraw electoral districts before sending them to
the General Assembly for up-or-down ratification without alteration. If a supermajority of the VRC fails to agree on redistricted maps or the General
Assembly fails to approve the maps, the Virginia Supreme Court will draw
the districts. The amendment triggered a fight over how to redistrict, how to
end partisan gerrymandering and how to protect minority voting rights. Virginians ratified the amendment in November 2020, but the disagreements
over the amendment and the VRC linger. The amendment and the VRC do
not fix Virginia’s redistricting problems. The VRC will end partisan gerrymandering but does not preclude bipartisan gerrymandering. The VRC may
help protect minority voting rights but may do so no more effectively or vigorously than the General Assembly would. Finally, the amendment forces
mapmakers – the VRC or the Virginia Supreme Court – to resolve policy
issues regarding representation the General Assembly should have addressed
before jettisoning its redistricting responsibilities. The constitutional amendment reflects vigorous action but may not yield much progress toward resolving Virginia's redistricting problems.
INTRODUCTION
The most contentious issue in the 2020 General Assembly session may
have been the vote to send the constitutional amendment creating the Virginia
Redistricting Commission (VRC) to Virginians for ratification. Ratified in
the November 2020 general election, the amendment transfers the constitutional responsibility to draw electoral maps for the House of Delegates, the
state Senate, and Virginia’s congressional delegation from the General Assembly to the VRC. 1 The VRC will draw the maps, which the General Assembly must approve without amendment to become effective.2 If the VRC
fails to agree on the maps or if the General Assembly fails to approve the

1

VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A; Rachel Weiner, Virginians approve turning redistricting over to bipartisan commission, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-redistricting-amendment-results/2020/11/02/5d1ef242-19f8-11eb-befb8864259bd2d8_story.html.
2 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(e).

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6

2

Chambers: The Fight Over the Virginia Redistricting Commission
Do Not Delete

2020]

3/30/2021 10:14 PM

VIRGINIA REDISTRICTING COMMISSION

83

maps, the Supreme Court of Virginia (SCOVA) will draw the maps.3 The
Governor no longer has a direct role in redistricting.4 If the amendment had
been rejected, the General Assembly would have retained its responsibility
to draw the maps through the regular legislative process, with the Governor
ultimately approving or vetoing the maps.5
The amendment attempts to resolve the partisanship that has plagued Virginia redistricting for decades and was particularly intense during the post2010 Census redistricting.6 During that redistricting, the House of Delegates,
controlled by Republicans, was primarily responsible for redistricting the
House.7 The state Senate, controlled by Democrats, was primarily responsible for redistricting the Senate.8 The electoral maps for the House and the
Senate were passed by both chambers and combined into one bill.9 Governor
McDonnell vetoed the bill, arguing the Senate redistricting was insufficiently
bipartisan. 10 About two weeks later, he signed a second set of maps the General Assembly passed.11 Disagreement between the House of Delegates and
state Senate regarding the congressional map delayed that map’s passage until 2012, even though the Virginia Constitution mandated redistricting occur
in 2011.12 All three maps were challenged in court, with the Senate map being
3

Id. § 6-A(g).
See id. § 6-A (providing no role for governor in selecting members of the Virginia Redistricting Commission or approving the work of the mapmakers).
5 See Will Gonzalez, Virginia voters, legislators split on redistricting amendment, PRINCE WILLIAM
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.princewilliamtimes.com/news/virginia-voters-legislators-split-on-redistricting-amendment/article_25abbb86-1c4d-11eb-a14e-b75e28d07c46.html.
6 See Jeff E. Schapiro, Schapiro: Democrats behaving like Republicans on redistricting, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH (Feb. 21, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/plus/schapiro-democrats-behaving-like-republicans-on-redistricting/article; see also Mark Joseph Stern, Virginia Democrats’ Victory Proves That Gerrymandering Matters, SLATE (Nov. 6, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/virginia-democrats-victory-after-killing-racial-gerrymander.html (describing the redistricting issues after the 2010
census).
7 See Andrew Cain, Wittman urges GA to reach redistricting deal, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 26,
2011), https://richmond.com/news/wittman-urges-ga-to-reach-redistricting-deal/article_28731806-d03e5e57-b8a9-9c6a20c41daa.html (describing redistricting maps made by the House).
8 See id.
9 Rosalind S. Helderman & Anita Kumar, Virginia assembly approves new legislative maps, WASH. POST
(Apr. 7, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/politics/virginia-assembly-approves-new-legislative-maps/2011/04/07/AFRjhrxC_story.html.
10 See Letter from Robert McDonnell, Virginia Governor, to Virginia House of Delegates (Apr. 15, 2011)
(on file with the Office of the Governor); see also Tyler Whitley, McDonnell vetoes legislature’s redistricting plan, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 16, 2011), https://richmond.com/news/mcdonnell-vetoes-legislatures-redistricting-plan/article_9ed0ccef-14f7-51e3-b04e-b92120a851a0.html (discussing the Governor's original veto).
11 See Andrew Cain, McDonnell signs redistricting bill, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 30, 2011),
https://richmond.com/news/mcdonnell-signs-redistricting-bill/article_32689192-4ee1-525e-9f5d6d7517a7c968.html (noting that Gov. McDonnell ultimately signed the resubmitted redistricting bill).
12 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (amended 2020) (“The General Assembly shall reapportion the Commonwealth
4
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the only map to survive without significant judicial alteration.13 The House
map and the congressional map were embroiled in litigation, with portions of
each map being redrawn by a special master.14 The current congressional districts were not finalized until 2016;15 the current House districts were not finalized until 2019.16
The campaign for a constitutional amendment to create a redistricting
commission that would curtail the General Assembly’s role in redistricting
lasted years.17 An amendment to the Virginia Constitution must pass the General Assembly twice, with a House of Delegates general election held between the two approvals, before being sent to Virginians for ratification.18 In
its 2019 session, the General Assembly approved the amendment for the first
time.19 A House of Delegates general election was held in November 2019.20
In 2020, the House of Delegates voted 54-46, and the Senate voted 38-2, to
approve the amendment and send it to the electorate for a referendum on the
November 2020 ballot.21
The 2020 General Assembly votes suggest a disagreement between the
House of Delegates and the Senate, but the real divide was among Democrats.22 Republicans in the General Assembly fully supported the
into electoral districts in accordance with this section in the year 2011 and every ten years thereafter.”).
13 Vesilind v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 813 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Va. 2018) (challenging the Senate and
House of Delegates maps but leading to no alterations); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137
S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017) (challenging the House of Delegates map); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct.
1732, 1734 (2016) (appealing a judgment striking down the congressional redistricting plan).
14 Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 873 (E.D. Va. 2019); Personhuballah
v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 555−56 (E.D. Va. 2016).
15 See Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 555, 565.
16 See Bethune-Hill, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 874.
17 See, e.g., About Us, ONEVIRGINIA2021 (2020), https://www.onevirginia2021.org/about-us/; S.J. Res.
18, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
18 VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
19 See S.J. Res. 306, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019). Though the vote in favor was overwhelming in the House and Senate, there was dissent, largely from African American representatives. See Graham Moomaw, General Assembly approves independent redistricting commission, despite objections
from black lawmakers, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2019), https://richmond.com/news/local/government-politics/general-assembly-approves-independent-redistricting-c%20lawmakers/article_b7c595db503a-55d8-abb9-316c368ef9be.html (noting concerns among African American legislators regarding the
possibility of insufficient minority representation on the Commission).
20 See Elections, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS (2019), https://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/search/year_from:2019/year_to:2019, for the November 2019 election results.
21 Virginia Question 1, Redistricting Commission Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA (2020), https://ballotpedia.org/Virginia_Question_1,_Redistricting_Commission_Amendment_(2020).
22 Mel Leonor, House opponents launch late bid to block amendment on redistricting by submitting new
plan, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 5, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/plus/house-opponents-launchlate-bid-to-block-amendment-on-redistricting-by-submitting-new-plan/article_b3565c14-9a86-5a8da17c-ae21e45b5adf.html.
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amendment.23 Their support was sensible. Given Democratic control over the
House of Delegates, the state Senate, and the governorship, the VRC – with
its equal number of Republicans and Democrats – provides Republicans more
power over redistricting than they would have otherwise.24 Conversely, the
Democratic Caucus was deeply divided over the amendment.25
The disagreement among the Democrats centered on a dispute regarding
minority voting rights and partisan gerrymandering.26 The Democrats who
voted against sending the amendment to a referendum – a group that included
most House Democrats, all House of Delegates members who represent majority African American districts, and a few Senate Democrats – argued the
amendment will not protect minority voting rights fully.27 The Democrats
who supported sending the amendment to a referendum – a group that included nearly all Senate Democrats and a small portion of House Democrats
– argued the VRC will eliminate partisan gerrymandering while protecting
minority voting rights.28 They suggest legislation the General Assembly
passed during the 2020 session defining redistricting criteria combines with
the amendment to guarantee minority voting rights will be fully protected.29

23

Schapiro, supra note 6.
See Mel Leonor, Efforts intensify to sway voters on redistricting plan, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (July
26, 2020) https://www.pressreader.com/usa/richmond-times-dispatch-weekend/20200726/281479278739128 (“Republicans broadly support the amendment, which they see as
their best shot at having a seat at the redistricting table now that they are in the minority. Republican
lawmakers, who for years gerrymandered Virginia’s maps and blocked reform efforts, compromised on
the amendment in the 2019 session as elections loomed.”); see also Schapiro, supra note 6 (“Republican
support for independent redistricting – after years of resisting it – might be a sly attempt to erect a procedural obstacle to a further decline in their ranks.”).
25 Leonor, supra note 22.
26 Id.
27 See Mel Leonor, House Panel Approves Redistricting Measure, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2020,
at A5 (noting Delegate Marcia Price’s (D-Newport News) concerns regarding protecting minority voting
rights).
28 Mel Leonor, Redistricting fight heats up with statewide referendum looming, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(July 24, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/virginia/redistricting-fight-heats-up-with-statewide-referendum-looming/article_872ab696-76a2-5a7a-8d06-449af6af8510.html (noting support for amendment
from Senate Democrats); Graham Moomaw, Virginia Democratic Party urges voters to defeat redistricting reform amendment, VA. MERCURY (June 24, 2020), https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/06/24/virginia-democratic-party-urges-voters-to-defeat-redistricting-reform-amendment/.
29 Schuyler VanValkenburg, Schuyler VanValkenburg column: It’s now or never on redistricting, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 19, 2020), https://richmond.com/opinion/columnists/schuyler-vanvalkenburg-column-it-s-now-or-never-onredistricting/article_36552d82-bb7e-5644-beb3-54f5e2c7969d.html (declaring
support for the amendment and urging the House of Delegates to pass the amendment for the second time);
Graham Moomaw, Virginia House passes redistricting reform measure, sending constitutional amendment to voters, VA. MERCURY (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/03/06/virginiahouse-passes-redistricting-reform-measure-sending-constitutional-amendment-to-voters/
(discussing
House vote on amendment and quoting Sen. Jennifer McClellan (D-Richmond) regarding enabling
24
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The dispute over minority voting rights and partisan gerrymandering is
real,30 but it obscures a deeper issue regarding what entity should draw the
lines that control how voters will be represented. The constitutional amendment removes the General Assembly – other than the eight legislator members of the VRC – from the map drawing portion of the redistricting process
in favor of the VRC, completely removes the governor from the redistricting
process, and requires the Supreme Court of Virginia (“SCOVA”) draw the
electoral districts in cases of disagreement.31 Though electoral maps reflect
policy choices, the constitutional amendment removes those policy choices
from elected representatives and places them with unelected bodies.32 That is
controversial and may be problematic.
This essay explores the disputes surrounding the VRC and the redistricting
process. Part I of this essay reviews the rules of redistricting in effect in Virginia before the 2020 General Assembly session. Part II discusses how the
constitutional amendment and the legislation the 2020 General Assembly
passed delineating redistricting criteria may combine to create a new redistricting regime in Virginia. Part III considers whether the new regime eliminates partisan gerrymandering, protects minority voting rights, and gives redistricting, policymaking authority to appropriate entities.
I. Redistricting Before the 2020 General Assembly Session
Before the recent amendment establishing the VRC passed, the Virginia
Constitution required the General Assembly redistrict the House of Delegates, the state Senate, and Virginia’s congressional delegation the year after
each U.S. decennial Census.33 The Virginia Constitution requires electoral
districts contain nearly equal population and be comprised of compact and
contiguous territory.34 Each districting map must also comply with the 14th
legislation). In its special session in November 2020, the General Assembly passed legislation specifying
procedures for the Virginia Redistricting Commission that ensure minority representation on the VRC.
See VA. CODE § 30-393(B) (2020) (requiring the judges who choose citizen members of the VRC consider
“the racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity of the Commonwealth” when doing so).
30 See Mel Leonor, House of Delegates backs constitutional amendment on redistricting, paving the way
for referendum, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 6, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/plus/house-of-delegates-backs-constitutional-amendment-on-redistricting-paving-the-way-for-referendum/article_5f5f76b8-644b-55bf-b7d8-ff5a8125d07e.html.
31 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A.
32 See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135, 153−58
(1999) (discussing contiguity and the policy choices that accompany districting).
33 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (amended 2020) (“Members of the House of Representatives of the United States
and members of the Senate and of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be elected from
electoral districts established by the General Assembly.”).
34 Id. (amended 2020) (“Every electoral district shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA).35 Typically, including in 2011, the General Assembly (or the Privileges and Elections Committee in each of the General Assembly’s chambers)
passed resolutions which summarized the legal requirements for redistricting
and provided additional redistricting criteria for the General Assembly.36
Though the redistricting rules and laws limited the General Assembly, the
General Assembly retained significant latitude in redistricting.37 Understanding the key disputes regarding the VRC requires knowing how Virginia redistricted after the 2010 Census and how the law changed the redistricting
landscape in Virginia prior to the General Assembly’s 2020 session.
A. The Law Applicable to Virginia’s 2011 and 2012 Redistricting
1. Equipopulous Districts
Consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s one person, one vote doctrine and
the Virginia Constitution, mapmakers must draw districts with populations
as equal as practicable to guarantee voters enjoy an equally weighted vote.38
However, courts allow district populations to deviate somewhat from perfect
equality when the application of districting principles that might keep communities of interest together, such as respect for political boundaries, yield a
set of appropriate and cohesive districts.39 State legislative districts may
and shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in proportion to the population of the district.”).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 2 (Va. 2001) (providing the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections’ redistricting rules); H.D. Comm. on Privileges & Elections,
Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011) (providing the House Committee on Privileges and Elections’ redistricting
rules); J. Reapportionment Comm. Res. (Va. 2015) (providing the Joint Reapportionment Committee’s
redistricting rules).
37 See, e.g., Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 108 (Va. 2002) (discussing the latitude the General Assembly had to draw districts consistent with multiple redistricting criteria).
38 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7−8 (1964). In the early 1900s, some states stopped redistricting after
each decennial Census. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191 (1962) (noting no reapportionment in
Tennessee from 1901 to 1961). As districts became ever more malapportioned, voters from large districts
argued their vote had less power than voters from small districts and claimed that violated the equal protection clause. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 567−68 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting). After initially
ruling the claim involved political questions in the 1960s, the Court found a right to an equally weighted
vote and operationalized the right by requiring districts be of nearly equal population. See id. at 552 (majority opinion); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560−61 (1964).
39 See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323 (1973) (noting that “absolute equality” may impair the
normal functioning of government). Some argue the need to keep jurisdictions together when redistricting
is a core value. See, e.g., Ryan McDougle, Sen. Ryan McDougle: Respecting local borders is a foundation
for sound redistricting, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 3, 2018), https://richmond.com/opinion/columnists/sen-ryan-mcdougle-respecting-local-borders-is-a-foundation-for-sound-redistricting/article_22e93f1f-2bda-5dd2-b91f-01388bff7a0d.html (arguing to maintain political boundaries as district
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deviate from their target population more than congressional districts.40 The
districting principles that lead to deviations from strict population equality
tend to be more relevant when state legislative districts are at issue than when
congressional districts are at issue. 41 Nonetheless, the equipopulous district
requirement makes redistricting primarily a task of moving district lines to
capture a target population inside of a district.42
2. Compactness and Contiguousness
Virginia’s electoral districts must be comprised of compact and contiguous territory.43 The limitations appear material, but they have not been significant redistricting constraints.44 Contiguousness requires all parts of a district be accessible to all other parts of the district without leaving the district.45
A district can be contiguous if parts of the district are separated by water or
even if the easiest way to get from one part of the district to another part of
the district is through a different district, if the district is cohesive.46 Functionally, if an unbroken line can be drawn around a district and encompass
only the district’s territory, the district is contiguous.47
Compactness would appear to be more constraining than contiguousness.
However, it may not be because compact districts need not be as compact as
possible.48 A compact district may be oddly shaped if the shape can be explained by other districting principles, such as the desire to keep political
subdivisions together or a preference to provide common representation to a
community of interest.49 Compactness is a principle but has not been much

boundaries).
40 See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306 (2016) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires States to ‘make an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable . . .’ The Constitution, however, does not demand mathematical perfection.”).
41 See id. at 1307 (discussing deviations regarding state legislative redistricting); see also Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 761−62 (2012) (noting deviations in congressional redistricting).
42 See, e.g., Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 265 (2015) (focusing on how voters were
moved into and out of districts to create equipopulous districts).
43 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
44 See Frederick McBride & Meredith Bell-Platts, Extreme Makeover: Racial Consideration and the Voting Rights Act in the Politics of Redistricting, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 327, 349−51 (2005), for a discussion
of why compactness and contiguity do not drive redistricting.
45 See Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 109 (Va. 2002).
46 See id.
47 See id. at 108; Chambers, Jr., supra note 32, at 159.
48 See Jamerson v. Womack, 423 S.E.2d 180, 185 (Va. 1992).
49 See Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 108−09; see also Jamerson, 423 S.E.2d at 186.
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of a districting limitation.50
3. Race, Redistricting, and the Voting Rights Act
Race is always an issue in redistricting but determining its appropriate use
in redistricting is tricky. Race typically may not be used by the government
when making laws.51 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
narrowly limits a state’s use of race, subjecting its intentional use to strict
scrutiny.52 To survive strict scrutiny, the use of race must serve a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.53 The Supreme
Court recognizes mapmakers are usually aware of race whenever they redistrict and may use race to help minority citizens exercise their right to vote
and to participate fully in the political system.54 Rather than require all uses
of race in districting survive strict scrutiny, the Court deems the use of race
to trigger strict scrutiny only when race is a predominant factor in redistricting.55 Race predominates when it subordinates other redistricting factors.56
The Court has not specified precisely how and when the use of race becomes
a predominant factor.57 When redistricting, jurisdictions may avoid constitutional scrutiny by using race in a limited fashion.58
However, jurisdictions may need to use race as a predominant factor when
necessary to vindicate minority voting rights under the Voting Rights Act
(VRA). When a jurisdiction does so, the use of race will be subject to strict

See Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 108 (“In summary, if the validity of the legislature's reconciliation of various
criteria is fairly debatable and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted, neither the court
below nor this Court can conclude that the resulting electoral district fails to comply with the compactness
and contiguous requirements of Article II, § 6.”).
51 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Retooling the Intent Requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13
TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. REV. 611, 611−14 (2004), for a general discussion of Fourteenth Amendment
limitations on the use of race.
52 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993) (discussing strict scrutiny in redistricting context).
53 See generally Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997).
54 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996). See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness,
Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L. J. 1397, 1418−19 (2002) (discussing the relationship
between the 14th and 15th Amendments and the right to vote).
55 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995); see also Reno, 509 U.S. at 642.
56 See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017).
57 For additional discussion of race predominance, see Part I.B, infra. Before the post-2010 Census redistricting cycle, race predominance had been used primarily to stop the use of race in redistricting that helped
minority voters. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 931 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
58 See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches
to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1837, 1882−84
(2018) (discussing the use of race without race predominance); see also Justin Levitt, Race, Redistricting,
and the Manufactured Conundrum, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 555, 566−67 (2017) (recognizing redistricting
bodies with draw districts with race in mind).
50
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scrutiny.59 The VRA protects the voting rights of minority voters against discrimination on the basis of race by safeguarding those voters’ ability to elect
their representative of choice on an equal basis as other voters.60 In the post2010 Census redistricting, sections 2 and 5 of the VRA were the key provisions relevant to redistricting.61 Section 2 of the VRA bars laws and procedures that intentionally discriminate or have the effect of discriminating in
the provision of voting rights on the basis of race.62 Section 5 of the VRA
required certain jurisdictions, defined by section 4 of the VRA, have their
voting changes precleared by the Justice Department or a three-judge panel
of the District Court of the District of Columbia before those changes became
effective.63 Those requirements helped drive the post-2010 Census redistricting.64
a. Section 2 of the VRA
Section 2 ensures minority voters can exercise their right to vote as fully
as other voters, in part, by requiring minority voters be able to elect their
candidate of choice as easily as other voters.65 In Thornburg v. Gingles,66 the
Supreme Court attempted to create a structure for distinguishing situations in
which minority voters are unable to elect their representative of choice because of their race from those in which minority voters are unable to elect
their representative of choice because they are a numerical minority. The
Gingles Court created three preconditions for a section 2 redistricting violation.67 The first precondition requires minority voters be able to constitute a
majority in a compact single-member district.68 The second requires those
59

See Vera, 517 U.S. at 977.
52 U.S.C. § 10301. See generally History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, DEP’T OF JUST. (July 28,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws (discussing the Voting Rights Act
reauthorization in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006).
61 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2316 (2018) (analyzing application of §2 and §5 of the
Voting Rights Act while considering legality of Texas redistricting).
62 § 10301(a) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . .”).
63 § 10304(a).
64 See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., REDISTRICTING AND THE 2010 CENSUS: ENFORCING SECTION 5 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 5 (2012).
65 See § 10301(b) (“ A violation of [section 2(a)] is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision
are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”).
66 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
67 Id. at 50−51.
68 Id. at 50.
60
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minority voters be politically cohesive and generally choose the same candidate of choice.69 The third requires racial bloc voting exist such that nonminority voters usually vote to defeat the candidate of choice of minority voters.70 If the preconditions are not met, in theory, minority voters are unable
to elect their candidates of choice because they are a numerical minority in
any fairly drawn district or because they split their vote or because they fail
to build coalitions with other willing voters to support the minority voters’
candidate of choice.71 If the preconditions are met, a court must consider an
additional set of factors to determine if minority voters have been subject to
discrimination.72 However, the preconditions are often the key to finding a
section 2 violation.73
A jurisdiction may remedy a section 2 violation or potential violation by
drawing a majority-minority district in which the minority voters can elect
their candidate of choice without help from other voters or by drawing one
or more crossover districts – districts in which minority voters can join with
reliable non-minority voters who will vote to elect the minority voters’ candidate of choice.74 A jurisdiction may be required to draw a majority-minority
district to remedy or avoid a section 2 violation.75 A jurisdiction cannot be
required to draw a crossover district to remedy a section 2 violation.76
b. Section 5 of the VRA
During the post-2010 Census redistricting cycle, section 5 of the VRA required jurisdictions covered under section 4 – including Virginia – to ask
permission of the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel of the Federal
District Court of the District of Columbia before using any new voting or
election laws.77 Preclearance ensures jurisdictions with troublesome voting
69

Id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
71 Id. at 50 n.17.
72 See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425−26 (2006).
73 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2330−31, 2335 (2018) (holding that a Texas voting district
was an impermissible racial gerrymander after applying the three Gingles factors).
74 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1471−72 (2017) (discussing redistricting obligations under § 2);
see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17, 23−24 (2009) (discussing the potential curative effects of
majority-minority and crossover districts).
75 See Perry, 548 U.S. at 430−31 (discussing need to match a §2 remedy to a §2 violation).
76 Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 23−24; see generally Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 404, 414−19 (2015) (analyzing Bartlett v. Strickland).
77 See 52 U.S.C. § 10304; About Section 5 Of The Voting Rights Act, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act.
70
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rights histories do not backslide with respect to providing equal voting rights
for minority voters.78 Voting changes are reviewed to ensure they do not lead
to retrogression in the ability of minority voters to exercise their right to vote
and elect their candidates of choice.79 In the redistricting context, non-retrogression typically requires a new electoral map maintain the number of districts in which minority voters can elect their candidates of choice.80 Whether
section 5 retrogression doctrine should consider only majority-minority districts in which minority voters can elect their candidates of choice on their
own or should also consider crossover districts in which minority voters can
usually elect their candidates of choice with help from others is complicated
and was not clear in the post-2010 Census redistricting cycle.81
4. 2011 Redistricting Criteria
The House Committee on Privileges and Elections and the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections passed resolutions on districting criteria
before beginning the redistricting process after the 2010 Census, one each for
House redistricting, Senate redistricting, and congressional redistricting.82
The resolutions incorporated the redistricting laws the General Assembly was
required to follow, requiring single-member districts of roughly equal population comprised of contiguous and compact territory that complied with the
Voting Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution.83 The only difference among
the resolutions were their district population deviation allowances.84 The resolutions allowed a +/- 1% deviation from population equality for House districts, a +/- 2% deviation for Senate districts, and no specific deviation from
equality for congressional districts which needed to be as equal as practicable.85
78

See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140−41 (1976).
See id. at 141; see also City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1983) (introducing the
test for whether redistricting had discriminatory retrogressive effect).
80 Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 138 (E.D. Va. 2018) (noting nonretrogression requires jurisdiction to maintain the number of districts in which minority voters can elect
their candidate of choice).
81 See id. The VRA’s 2006 Amendments measure a minority group’s voting power under the VRA by
how many of its preferred candidates the group could elect. See § 10304(b) (noting section 5’s purpose is
“to protect the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice.”).
82 See generally H.D. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011); S. Comm. on
Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 2 (Va. 2011).
83 See Va. Comm. Res. No. 1.
84 See Chambers, Jr., supra note 32, at 163–64, for a discussion of the value of having different districting
principles for districting different legislatures.
85 See VA. DIV. OF LEG. SERV., DRAWING THE LINE 2011: REDISTRICTING IN VIRGINIA NO. 2, at 1 (2011),
http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/data/publications/2011Draw2.pdf.
79
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In addition to the legal requirements, the resolutions noted districts should
be based on communities of interest, defining them to include “economic
factors, social factors, cultural factors, geographic features, governmental jurisdictions and service delivery areas, political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations.”86 However, the resolutions noted governmental
jurisdiction and precinct lines were no more probative of the existence of a
community of interest than any other factor mentioned.87 As important, the
resolutions suggested that weighing the factors that trigger a finding of a
community of interest “is an intensely political process best carried out by
elected representatives of the people.”88 Recognizing the inevitable clash of
districting criteria, the resolutions noted “population equality among districts
and compliance with federal and state constitutional requirements and the
Voting Rights Acts of 1965 shall be given priority in the event of conflict
among the criteria.”89 The resolutions constrained mapmakers but provided
mapmakers sufficient discretion to draw the districts they believed proper.90
5. How the General Assembly Redistricted in 2011 and 2012
The General Assembly faced a difficult set of issues when redistricting
after the 2010 Census. Its tasks were to draw 100 equipopulous House of
Delegates districts, 40 equipopulous state Senate districts, and 11 equipopulous congressional districts.91 All districts needed to be compact and comprised of contiguous territory.92 The General Assembly also needed to consider race enough to comport with the Voting Rights Act, but not so much
that the redistricting would violate the 14th Amendment.93 The General Assembly redistricted around two key issues: incumbency protection and the
preservation of majority-minority districts.94 The process produced political
wrangling and charges of partisan gerrymandering, as well as lawsuits that

86

Va. Comm. Res. No. 1. See Chambers, Jr., supra note 32, at 179–80 (discussing communities of interest).
87 See, e.g., Va. Comm. Res. No. 1 (“Local government jurisdiction and precinct lines may reflect communities of interest to be balanced, but they are entitled to no greater weight as a matter of state policy
than other identifiable communities of interest.”).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 See VA. DIV. OF LEG. SERV., DRAWING THE LINE 2011: REDISTRICTING IN VIRGINIA NO. 1, at 17 (2011),
http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/data/publications/2011Draw1.pdf (specifying the General Assembly’s redistricting tasks and the population totals that would guide the tasks).
92 Va. Comm. Res. No. 1.
93 See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 795 (2017).
94 See id. at 794–96; see also Helderman & Kumar, supra note 9.
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led to special masters redrawing some districts in the House of Delegates map
and in the congressional map.95
In the post-2010 Census redistricting, partisan gerrymandering and incumbency protection, though different, may have dovetailed.96 Partisan gerrymandering occurs when one party seeks to increase its electoral advantage
unfairly by drawing electoral districts that favor its members.97 Incumbency
protection shields current legislators from competition and entrenches the
electoral status quo.98 The General Assembly’s redistricting criteria allowed
incumbency protection.99 When incumbency protection is overlaid on a state
with parties of shifting popularity, the result appears to be partisan gerrymandering.100 Maintaining the status quo in that situation limits the electoral gains
that should go to the party with increasing popularity and has the same effect
as partisan gerrymandering, even if the motivation is different.101 That may
have occurred in the 2011/2012 redistricting.102
The preservation of majority-minority districts was also a core issue in the
2011/2012 redistricting.103 Consistent with section 2 of the VRA, the criteria
barred unwarranted retrogression in the ability of minority voters to elect
their candidates of choice.104 The General Assembly did that by maintaining
the majority-minority districts in their approximate geographic locations.105

95

See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 873 (E.D. Va. 2019) (ordering the
House of Delegates to adopt a new redistricting plan); see also Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d
552, 556 (E.D. Va. 2016) (ordering the General Assembly to devise new congressional districts).
96 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 285−86 (2001), for a discussion of the relatedness of partisan gerrymandering and incumbency protection.
97 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491, 2493 (2019) (discussing partisan gerrymanders).
98 See id. at 2500 (noting incumbent entrenchment); see also Stephen Ansolabehere & James Snyder, Jr.,
The Effects of Redistricting on Incumbents, 11 ELECTION L.J. 490, 491 (2012).
99 H.D. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011).
100 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500–01 (discussing incumbency protection and partisan gerrymandering).
101 See id. at 2499–500.
102 For example, that would explain how the partisan split in the Virginia House of Delegates changed
from a 67-32 Republican majority in 2011 to a 55-44 Democratic majority in 2019. See Virginia General
Assembly, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Virginia_General_Assembly (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
103 See Va. Comm. Res. No. 1; see also Redistricting in Virginia after the 2010 census, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Virginia_after_the_2010_census (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
104 Va. Comm. Res. No. 1.
105 See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13CV678, 2015 WL 3604029, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 5,
2015) (comparing BVAP from single majority-minority congressional district on 2001 map with single
majority-minority congressional district on 2011 map); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Request
for Three-Judge Court with Expedited Review at 29−30, Virginia v. Holder, No. 1:11-CV-00885, 2011
WL 9203778 (D.D.C. May 9, 2011) (aligning majority-minority state legislative districts from 2001 map
with those in 2011 maps).
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The redistricting for the House, the Senate, and the congressional delegations followed a simple process: use the existing districts from the 2001 redistricting as a baseline, be sensitive to incumbents, and repopulate and maintain majority-minority districts.106 The mapmakers for the House of
Delegates and the congressional districts went one step farther by using a
55% Black Voting Age Population (BVAP) minimum when redistricting majority-minority districts.107 Those who redistricted the Senate did not use the
BVAP minimum.108
Litigation regarding the House and congressional redistricting maps ensued, culminating in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections109 and
Wittman v. Personhubullah110 respectively. The key question regarding the
House and congressional maps was whether race predominated.111 In both
cases, the trial courts found race was a predominant factor in the redistricting.112 Some districts were redrawn on both maps.113
The remnants of incumbency protection, possible partisan gerrymandering, and the protection of majority-minority districts from the 2011 and 2012
redistricting linger in the collection of oddly shaped districts that helped trigger the amendment that created the VRC.114 Some may argue incumbency
protection is inherently unstable because redistricting lasts for 10 years. Over
time, the population that lives in a district may change demographically or
electorally, with a safe district becoming unsafe or flipping altogether.115 If
See, e.g., Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *1 (noting the congressional redistricting architect’s plan included speaking with each member of the Virginia congressional delegation about the redistricting and
ensuring the majority-minority district did not retrogress); see also id. at *20 (Payne, J., dissenting) (discussing congressional districting: “As I understand the record, the redistricting decision here was driven
by a desire to protect incumbents and by the application of traditional redistricting precepts even though
race was considered because the legislature had to be certain that the plan complied with federal law,
including the Voting Rights Act of 196532 (“VRA”) and, in particular, the non-retrogression provision of
Section 5 of the VRA.”).
107 Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017). BVAP is used as a rough guide
to determine when a district can be controlled by African American voters. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S.
Ct. 1455, 1474−76 (2007).
108 See Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Opening Brief at 35, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:14-cv00852-REP-GBL-BMK (E.D. Va. July 20, 2015).
109 Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 794.
110 Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2016).
111 Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 800; Wittman, 136 S. Ct. at 1735.
112 Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13CV678, 2015 WL 3604029, at *19 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015);
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018).
113 Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 557, 563 (E.D. Va. 2016); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 885−86 (E.D. Va. 2019).
114 See S.J. Res. 18, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (enacted into law in the Acts of Assembly
Chapter 1196).
115 See Virginia House of Delegates District 72, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Virginia_House_of_Delegates_District_72 (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (showing Virginia House District 72
106
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Republican gerrymandering drove redistricting in 2011 and 2012, some
might argue the gerrymander did not work well because Democrats now control both chambers of the General Assembly. To the contrary, partisan gerrymandering may have worked well if Republicans retained power for one or
two election cycles longer than they would in the gerrymandering’s absence.
Regardless, the focus on gerrymandering illuminates the constitutional
amendment.116
B. Legal Clarifications Since the Post-2010 Census Redistricting
Since the post-2010 Census redistricting, the Supreme Court has altered
legal doctrine, substantively changing redistricting in the process.117 For example, the Court clarified partisan gerrymandering, section 5 preclearance,
and race predominance.118
In Rucho v. Common Cause,119 the Court ruled partisan gerrymandering
does not violate the United States Constitution.120 The Court suggested partisan gerrymandering is inconsistent with constitutional principles.121 However, it deemed partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable, asserting no judicially manageable standards exist to remedy it.122 The Court noted states
could remedy partisan gerrymandering with state laws and redistricting commissions.123
In Shelby County v. Holder,124 the Court gutted preclearance and section 5
of the VRA. It deemed section 4 – the section that determined which

evolved from having a Republican delegate who faced no opponent in his primary or general election to
having a Democrat win the seat in a contested race in 2017 and be reelected in 2019); see also Virginia
House of Delegates District 73, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Virginia_House_of_Delegates_District_73 (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (showing Virginia House District 73 evolved from being
presented by an incumbent Republican to being represented by a Democratic delegate in 2017 and by a
different Democratic delegate in 2019).
116 See Va. S.J. Res. 18 (enacted into law in the Acts of Assembly Chapter 1196).
117 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506−07 (2019); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529, 556−57 (2013); Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 271−73 (2015).
118 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506−07 (2019); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529, 556−57 (2013); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 271−73 (2015).
119 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2484.
120 Id. at 2506-07 (ruling partisan gerrymandering claims are political questions that the federal courts
have no jurisdiction to resolve, but suggesting various alternatives to states, including cabining redistricting discretion though state law or redistricting commissions).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2491. Over the past three decades, the Court contemplated finding a cause of action based on
partisan gerrymandering, but never did. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309−10 (2004); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
123 Rucho, 139 S.Ct. at 2507−08.
124 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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jurisdictions were subject to section 5 – unconstitutional.125 That released jurisdictions such as Virginia from their preclearance obligation.126 Section 5
and preclearance were technically untouched, but section 5 preclearance does
not currently apply to any jurisdictions formerly covered under section 4.127
For the first time in decades, Virginia need not worry about preclearing its
redistricted maps or whether those maps are retrogressive with respect to protecting minority voting rights.128
In multiple cases since 2012, the Court confirmed the racial predominance
doctrine in redistricting, indicating the inquiry is fact-specific and not formulaic. In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus (ALBC) v. Alabama,129 the Court
found that Alabama moved large numbers of African American voters into
multiple districts to keep the BVAP% in those districts higher than necessary
to ensure non-retrogression. Though moving people into districts because of
their race was the constitutional violation in Shaw v. Reno130 that triggered
the racial predominance structure, the ALBC Court declined to rule that race
predominated in that case, leaving the issue for the trial court to determine.131
Similarly, in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections,132 the Court
declined to find the movement of many African American voters into districts
to effectuate a BVAP % minimum sufficient to prove racial predominance,
leaving the matter to the trial court.133 Those cases clarify that states may
explicitly use race in redistricting if such use does not subordinate other traditional districting principles and that the subordination decision is a caseby-case determination.
Whether the use of race predominates matters because a finding of race
predominance triggers strict scrutiny.134 Surviving strict scrutiny requires the
use of race serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve
the state interest.135 Traditionally, the need to comply with section 2 or 5 of

125

Id. at 557.
Id.
127 Id. at 540; Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5.
128 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 552−53 (2013). Virginia had been subject to preclearance
since 1965. See Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 127.
129 Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 265 (2015).
130 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642−44 (1993).
131 See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 264.
132 Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
133 Id. at 802.
134 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O’Connor, J., Concurring) (noting race
predominance triggers strict scrutiny).
135 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1469 (2017).
126
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the VRA has been considered a compelling state interest.136 Section 5’s preclearance provision is no longer operable and complying with it is no longer
a compelling state interest.137 Compliance with section 2 may remain a compelling state interest, but a jurisdiction must have a strong basis to believe it
needs to use race to comply with section 2 to meet the narrow tailoring
prong.138 If section 2’s coverage narrows – as it may – asserting compliance
with it to be a compelling state interest will become more difficult.
Just before the General Assembly’s 2020 session, the rules of redistricting
were in flux. The traditional requirements of equal populations, compactness, and contiguousness remained.139 The requirement that race be used as
much as necessary to protect minority voting under the VRA, but not so much
that it offended the race predominance limitation under the 14th Amendment,
also remained.140 If the redistricting criteria from 2011 were to be used, incumbency protection and possible partisan gerrymandering could be part of
the redistricting process. The General Assembly stepped into that morass and
changed the rules.141 Part II discusses how the General Assembly attempted
to restructure the redistricting process during its 2020 session by advancing
the constitutional amendment and passing legislation that redefines the criteria for redistricting.
II. General Assembly 2020
The General Assembly took two key actions in its 2020 regular session to
address perceived problems with the redistricting process. It approved the
constitutional amendment creating the VRC and it passed redistricting criteria to govern the redistricting process.142 The legislation provides the VRC
the equivalent of the redistricting criteria the House and Senate Privileges
and Elections Committees traditionally provided before each decennial redistricting.143 The General Assembly inserted its redistricting policy preferences
136

Id.; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
KAREN SHANTON, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE. LEGISLATURES, VOTER ID IN THE COURTS 4 (2014).
138 See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472 (finding that states cannot use race as a predominant factor in redistricting when the state had no reason to believe it needed to use race to comply with section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act).
139 See H.D. 758, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
140 See id.
141 See MARY SPAIN, DRAWING THE LINE 2011: REDISTRICTING IN VIRGINIA, NO. 1, at 24 (2010); see also
Va. H.D. 758.
142 See S.J. Res. 18, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). In a special session, the General Assembly
passed legislation specifying the VRC’s procedures. See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-391 (2020).
143 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04 (2020), with H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm.
Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011).
137
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into law, regulating the redistricting process regardless of the entity that ultimately redistricts.144
The amendment and the legislation require minority voting rights be protected.145 Supporters of the VRC argue the amendment and the legislation
guarantee the VRC will protect minority voting rights and end partisan gerrymandering.146 Opponents argue the VRC is not structured to ensure minority voting rights are protected and that nothing in the amendment or the legislation guarantees minority voting rights will be fully protected.147
A. Virginia Redistricting Commission
The constitutional amendment creates the VRC, a bipartisan redistricting
commission.148 The VRC consists of 16 members – eight legislators and
eight citizens.149 The legislators will be two Democratic Delegates, two Republican Delegates, two Democratic Senators, and two Republican Senators.150 Each legislator is deemed to “represent [a] political party[.]”151
Whether the legislators are supposed to represent their party’s interests or are
deemed to represent their party because they were chosen by a party leader
is unclear. The citizen members will be chosen by retired state Circuit Court
judges from lists provided by the Speaker of the House, the minority leader
in the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the minority leader
in the Senate.152 Two citizens will be chosen from each list.
The VRC requires bipartisan agreement, with each redistricting map requiring a slightly different 75% supermajority before it is approved and sent
to the General Assembly.153 At least six of the legislator members and six of
the citizen members must agree to a congressional redistricting map before
the map is submitted to the General Assembly for an up-or-down vote with
no changes.154 The House of Delegates map must be approved by at least six
legislators – which must include at least three of four Delegates – and six
144

See generally VanValkenburg, supra note 29; see also § 30-399(E) (noting the Virginia Supreme Court
must follow VA. CODE § 24.2-304.04 if it redistricts).
145 See § 24.2-304.04; see also VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
146 See VanValkenburg, supra note 29.
147 See Leonor, supra note 30.
148 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A.
149 Id. § 6-A(b).
150 Id. § 6-A(b)(1)(A)−(D).
151 Id.
152 Id. § 6-A(b)(2)(A)−(B).
153 See id. § 6-A(d)(1)−(3).
154 Id. § 6-A(d)(1)−(2).
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citizen members.155 The Senate map must be approved by at least six legislators – which must include three of four Senators – and six citizen members.156
If the commission agrees to a House map and a Senate map, the maps will be
combined into one package and sent to the General Assembly for acceptance
or rejection, without amendment.157
The Supreme Court of Virginia (SCOVA) may ultimately draw the maps.
If the VRC cannot agree on maps to submit to the General Assembly, the
SCOVA will draw the maps.158 If the General Assembly rejects the VRC’s
maps, and then rejects the maps the VRC resubmits for reconsideration, the
SCOVA will draw the maps.159 VRC members may consider SCOVA’s backstopping role when agreeing to or declining to agree to maps. Commission
members may feel an obligation to negotiate and act in good faith, but they
have no obligation to agree to a map they do not like.160 A commission member may reasonably decline to approve a map if the member believes the
SCOVA will draw a better or more appropriate map. The possibility of gridlock is a feature of a process that requires a 75% supermajority, not a bug.161
The SCOVA is the designated backup when the VRC or the General Assembly cannot reach consensus.162
The amendment contains two provisions designed to protect minority
rights. The first requires each electoral district be “drawn in accordance with
the requirements of federal and state laws that address racial and ethnic fairness . . . and judicial decisions interpreting such laws.”163 That provision is
arguably superfluous, merely requiring districts be consistent with existing
law. The second provision requires districts be drawn to “provide, where
practicable, opportunities for racial and ethnic communities to elect candidates of their choice.”164 That provision may suggest the VRC must do more
than merely comply with the legal requirement that minority voters be allowed to elect their representatives of choice. However, the clause “where
practicable” can be interpreted to suggest the VRC should determine when it
should do more than the minimum required to protect minority voting rights,
155

Id. § 6-A(d)(3).
Id. § 6-A(d)(2).
157 Id. § 6-A(e)−(f).
158 Id. § 6-A(g).
159 Id. § 6-A(f).
160 See id. (delegating redistricting to the Supreme Court of Virginia if the General Assembly fails to
agree).
161 See id. § 6-A(d)(1)−(3).
162 See id. § 6-A(f)−(g).
163 Id. § 6.
164 Id.
156
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leaving anything more than minimal protection for voting rights dependent
on the good intentions of the VRC. Anything more than minimal protection
for minority voting rights may require the good intentions of the SCOVA, if
the SCOVA must redistrict.165
B. Legislating Redistricting Criteria
The 2020 General Assembly passed legislation that specifies redistricting
criteria. The criteria are sensible, but the legislation does not indicate precisely how the criteria are to be used.166 The legislation provides rules and
principles but does not indicate which rules are most important or how they
should be balanced against one another.167 Unless additional criteria or explanations of the criteria are forthcoming, the mapmaker will need to make
choices about significant policy issues that the criteria do not address. The
entities that might be responsible for redistricting – the VRC or the SCOVA
– may have different views about how to resolve those policy issues.
1. Equipopulous Districts
The legislation requires equipopulous districts, with allowable population
deviations.168 State legislative districts are allowed population deviations up
to plus or minus five percent, allowing a 10% total maximum deviation consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine on the issue.169 The legislation
does not afford congressional districts any specific population deviation.170
That is narrower than federal law, which allows congressional districts small,
reasonable deviations from population equality if the deviations can be justified.171
2. Contiguousness and Compactness
The legislation suggests a stronger emphasis on the Virginia Constitution’s contiguousness and compactness requirements than in past
165

See id. § 6-A(f)−(g).
See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04 (2020).
167 See H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011).
168 See § 24.2-304.04(1) (“Districts shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in proportion to the population of the district. A deviation of no more than five percent shall be
permitted for state legislative districts.”).
169 See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1305, 1307 (2016).
170 See § 24.2-304.04(1).
171 See Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 759 (2012).
166
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redistricting, but the mapmakers may be no more constrained by the new
principles than prior criteria that operationalized the constitutional requirements.172 The 2011 redistricting resolutions deemed contiguousness to include contiguousness by water.173 The 2020 legislation redefines contiguousness by water to exclude contiguousness solely “by connections by water
running downstream or upriver.”174 The new requirement appears to require
a mapmaker ensure parts of a district separated by water lie directly across
the body of water from one another.175 The contiguousness requirement may
have been tightened, but compliance with it appears relatively easy.
The new law appears to strengthen the compactness requirement by requiring mapmakers consider actual compactness measures when drawing
districts.176 That appears to provide an impetus for mapmakers to ensure a
district is comprised of compact territory. However, the legislation does not
require a district be as compact as possible or meet a minimum level of compactness to be deemed compact.177 The legislation’s approach differs somewhat from the SCOVA’s approach to compactness – which is indeterminate
and provides no standard for compactness – but similarly provides no firm
standard.178 The legislation appears to provide a duty that mapmakers consider compactness and contiguousness more rigorously, but provides little
basis for a court to determine whether mapmakers have done so adequately.
3. Race and Redistricting
The legislation tracks the proposed constitutional amendment regarding
race and redistricting. Districts must comply with state and federal law, including the Voting Rights Act, and “relevant judicial decisions relating to
racial and ethnic fairness.”179 The legislation also provides a basis for
172

See § 24.2-304.04(6).
See H. Comm. on Privileges and Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011).
174 § 24.2-304.04(6) (“Districts shall be composed of contiguous territory, with no district contiguous only
by connections by water running downstream or upriver, and political boundaries may be considered.”).
175 See id.
176 § 24.2-304.04(7) (“Districts shall be composed of compact territory and shall be drawn employing one
or more standard numerical measures of individual and average district compactness, both statewide and
district by district.”).
177 See id.
178 See Vesilind v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 813 S.E.2d 739, 748 (Va. 2018).
179 § 24.2-304.04(2). The legislation explicitly bars cracking and packing. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 286−87 n.7 (2004) (“‘Packing’ refers to the practice of filling a district with a supermajority of a
given group or party. ‘Cracking’ involves the splitting of a group or party among several districts to deny
that group or party a majority in any of those districts.”); see also § 24.2-304.04(3) (“A violation of this
subdivision is established if, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that districts were
drawn in such a way that members of a racial or language minority group are dispersed into districts in
173
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mapmakers to protect minority voting rights more vigorously than the law
requires, noting: “[D]istricts shall be drawn to give racial and language minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and shall
not dilute or diminish their ability to elect candidates of choice either alone
or in coalition with others.”180 That language is consistent with allowing mapmakers to draw crossover districts where sensible. However, it might not
force mapmakers to draw crossover districts whenever and wherever the
mapmaker can, especially when doing so conflicts with other redistricting
criteria.
4. Communities of Interest
Consistent with the 2011 redistricting criteria, the legislation treats communities of interest as the building blocks of districts.181 However, the 2020
legislation defines communities of interest quite differently than the 2011
criteria did, likely triggering a different style of redistricting. The legislation
retains part of the definition of communities of interest from the 2011 redistricting criteria but jettisons other parts.182 Both the new law and the 2011
redistricting criteria deem shared economic, social, and cultural interests to
help create geographical communities of interest.183 However, whereas the
2011 criteria note that “political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations” are relevant to the creation of communities of interest, the new
law asserts a community of interest is not “a community based upon political
affiliation or relationship with a political party, elected official, or candidate
for office.”184
The new law’s exclusion is ironic, but not surprising. A geographically
defined group that has similar “social, cultural and economic interests” might
share a political affiliation and a community of interest, without regard to

which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or are concentrated into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.”). However, such limitations have been a part of VRA section 2 doctrine for
years. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 670 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing racial gerrymanders
and cracking and packing); see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993).
180 § 24.2-304.04(4).
181 See § 24.2-304.04(5) (“Districts shall be drawn to preserve communities of interest.”).
182 Compare S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011) (including economic,
social, and cultural factors as well as “political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations”),
with VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(5) (including “social, cultural, and economic interests” but excluding
“political affiliation or relationship with a political party, elected official, or candidate for office”).
183 See § 24.2-304.04(5).
184 Compare Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 877 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2019),
with VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(5).
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how the criteria defines community of interest.185 The General Assembly’s
removal of political affiliation and incumbency protection from the list of
factors that could create a community of interest is unsurprising, because the
constitutional amendment focuses on removing partisanship from the redistricting process.186 The removal of political factors may be reasonable, but
deeming a community of interest to not include political considerations may
not reflect reality.
Ironically, removing politics from the definition of communities of interest
may be at cross purposes with protecting minority voters’ rights. The Gingles
preconditions that were devised to determine if minority voters have been
subject to discrimination require the existence of a geographically compact,
politically cohesive group of minority voters who are usually unable to elect
their candidate of choice because of racial bloc voting.187 Those preconditions
appear to assume politically based communities of interest may exist.188 Indeed, majority-minority and crossover districts cluster minority voters to allow them to elect their representative of choice because they can form politically cohesive communities.189 If mapmakers want to draw a majorityminority or crossover district, the new law’s definition of community of interest suggests that the minority voters’ race should be considered in redistricting but their political cohesiveness should not be.190 That is odd.
5. Partisan Gerrymandering
The legislation bans partisan gerrymandering by barring statewide maps
that “unduly favor or disfavor any political party.”191 How undue favor would
be defined and how the limitation would be enforced is unclear. Determining
how much partisan gerrymandering is too much partisan gerrymandering is
difficult.192 A mapmaker’s intentional partisan favoritism or a finding that a
map represents a substantial deviation from proportional representation
185

§ 24.2-304.04(5).
See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A (creating bipartisan commission). Compare S. Comm. on Privileges &
Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011) (including economic, social, and cultural factors as well as “political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations”), with § 24.2-304.04(5) (including “social,
cultural, and economic interests” but excluding “political affiliation or relationship with a political party,
elected official, or candidate for office”).
187 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 (1986).
188 See id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
189 See id. at 51 (majority opinion) (noting political cohesion is the second Gingles factor).
190 § 24.2-304.04(5).
191 § 24.2-304.04(8).
192 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 U.S. 2484, 2506−07 (2019) (suggesting the impossibility of determining how much partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally suspect).
186
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might seem sufficient to trigger a finding of unfair partisan advantage, but
the legislation provides no hint regarding whether either would. 193 The legislation indicates disdain for partisan gerrymandering but provides no legal
standard for defining it.194
C. Redistricting in 2021
Redistricting in 2021 in Virginia has been designed to be quite different
than redistricting in 2011 and 2012. The redistricting criteria differ significantly in tone and direction from the redistricting criteria used to redistrict
after the 2010 Census.195 The legislation encourages deeper consideration of
compactness and contiguousness.196 The legislation eliminates political considerations and incumbency considerations from the definition of communities of interest.197 Both the amendment and the legislation suggest mapmakers
should protect minority voting rights somewhat aggressively, at least more
than the law minimally requires.198 Lastly, the amendment’s creation of the
VRC removes the balancing of redistricting criteria that informs mapmaking
from elected representatives and places it with unelected entities.199 The 2021
mapmakers, whether the VRC or the SCOVA, face a different set of rules
than the 2011 General Assembly faced. Presumably, the General Assembly
wants to see a different outcome.
Part III considers whether the General Assembly’s actions in its 2020 session fix the redistricting problems it sought to fix and whether those actions
may have created other problems.
III. Why the Fight Matters
The constitutional amendment passed in November 2020; the rift the

193

See Gill v. Whitford, 138 U.S. 1916, 1924 (2018) (discussing statistics and political partisanship); see
also § 24.2-304.04.
194 See Gregory Schneider, Divided Democrats in Virginia House Pass Proposed Amendment for Redistricting Commission, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-house-passes-anti-gerrymandering-amendment/2020/03/06/8794ac56-5f04-11ea-b0144fafa866bb81_story.html.
195 Compare H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011), with § 24.2-304.04.
196 See § 24.2-304.04(6)−(7).
197 See § 24.2-304.04(5).
198 See § 24.2-304.04; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
199 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(2) (assigning redistricting to the VRC or to SCOVA if the General
Assembly does not approve the VRC’s maps).
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amendment caused in the Democratic Party may linger.200 This Part addresses
four questions that illuminate the dispute. First, is the VRC necessary? Second, does the VRC cure partisan gerrymandering? Third, does the VRC fully
protect minority voting rights? Fourth, are policy issues given to the VRC or
the SCOVA better left with the General Assembly? Only after considering
these issues can one fully evaluate the substance of the disagreement regarding the VRC.
A. Is the VRC necessary?
If the VRC is not necessary, the amendment creating the VRC is unnecessary. Supporters of the amendment have argued that allowing the General
Assembly to redistrict itself triggers an inherent conflict of interest.201 Redistricting supposedly involves the General Assembly picking its voters.202 That
is clever, but misleading. Apportionment provides common representation to
geographic territory and the people who live on that land.203 A district’s voters change over time and a politician must win those voters in primaries and
in each general election.204 Drawing district lines does not amount to choosing one’s voters for a decade and does not ensure retaining one’s seat.205 As
important, the asserted conflict of interest does not apply to congressional
redistricting; General Assembly members do not serve in Congress. In
200

The Democratic Party of Virginia opposed the constitutional amendment. See Moomaw, supra note

28.
See, e.g., About Us, supra note 17 (“It is a conflict of interest for the legislature to be the sole decider
when their own district lines are redrawn.”); see generally Ryan Snow, Legislative Control Over Redistricting as Conflicts of Interest: Addressing The Problem of Partisan Gerrymandering Using State Conflicts Of Interest Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 147 (2017).
202 See, e.g., Bobby Vassar & Wyatt Durrette, Bobby Vassar and Wyatt Durrette column: On redistricting,
Virginia can do better, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (July 20, 2020), https://richmond.com/opinion/columnists/bobby-vassar-and-wyatt-durrette-column-on-redistricting-virginia-can-do-better/article_0da23a050ea7-5ebc-b710-03427269d620.html.
203 See Chambers, Jr., supra note 32, at 137.
204 See Jenna Portnoy et al., Webb wins Democratic VA05 nomination in landslide; Gade wins GOP Senate
primary, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginiaprimary-voters-head-to-the-polls-amid-coronavirus/2020/06/22/2c114f64-b49b-11ea-aca5ebb63d27e1ff_story.html.
205 See Philip Bump, Eric Cantor didn’t lose because of low turnout. He lost because turnout was so high,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/12/cantordidnt-lose-because-of-low-turnout-he-lost-because-turnout-was-so-high/ (discussing House Majority
Leader Eric Cantor’s primary loss to Dave Brat). Indeed, one’s party may not retain the seat. See Stephen
J. Farnsworth & Stephen Hanna, How Spanberger won a district drawn by and for republicans, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2018), https://richmond.com/opinion/columnists/stephen-j-farnsworth-and-stephen-hanna-column-how-spanberger-won-a-district-drawn-by-and/article_83c85c0e-ecf2-5ac1-b06cad7fc4f7413c.html (discussing how Democratic Rep. Spanberger won her seat from Republican Rep.
Dave Brat).
201

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6

26

Chambers: The Fight Over the Virginia Redistricting Commission
Do Not Delete

2020]

3/30/2021 10:14 PM

VIRGINIA REDISTRICTING COMMISSION

107

addition, the Virginia Governor, who is now excluded from the redistricting
process, is limited to one term, is elected statewide, and does not choose his
voters. The amendment addresses more than the supposed problem.206
If the VRC is ostensibly necessary because the General Assembly is unable to redistrict properly due to its conflict of interest, the General Assembly
and its members should be completely removed from the redistricting process. The amendment’s failure to do so suggests the conflict of interest argument is weak or nonexistent. Half of the VRC’s members are legislators chosen by party leaders to serve.207 At least six of eight legislators must vote in
favor of a VRC map before it can be sent to the General Assembly for approval.208 The amendment gives a veto to legislators serving on the VRC and
gives the General Assembly a veto over the VRC’s maps.209 The General Assembly can reject a map once, leaving the VRC the opportunity to resubmit
the map for approval.210 That presumably allows the General Assembly to
send an explicit or implicit message regarding why it rejected the map and
what it wants the map to look like when the map is resubmitted to the General
Assembly. If the General Assembly should be removed from substantive redistricting decision-making, the amendment does not resolve the problem.
As the General Assembly’s continuing presence in the redistricting process suggests, the conflict-of-interest argument is not about an institutional
conflict.211 However, the argument may suggest personal conflicts of interest.
That conflict may occur when a representative encourages the mapmakers to
draw a district that is favorable to the representative.212 That may appear
problematic but is not as problematic as it seems; voters must vote for the
legislator if the legislator is to remain in office.213 Nonetheless, if legislators
are concerned about the effect their input may have on their district’s boundaries, they can stop providing input on how their districts should be drawn.
That might be unfortunate if insight from a representative about the communities of interest inside the representative’s district might be helpful in constructing a district. Not surprisingly, neither the constitutional amendment
206

See generally VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A (noting the purpose of establishing districts).
See id. § 6-A(b)(1).
208 Id. § 6-A(d)(3).
209 See id. § 6-A(d), (f).
210 See id. § 6-A(f)−(g).
211 See Katherine R. Schroth, Preparing for the Next Decade: Evaluating the Potential Redistricting Commission in Virginia, 23 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 57, 70 (2019) (“Although the purpose of the Commission
is to remove politics from the process, the General Assembly does not totally give up its current redistricting power.”).
212 See id.
213 See VA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2–3.
207
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nor the legislation creating the VRC’s procedures appears to bar legislators
from providing input on their districts to the VRC or its members.214 If the
General Assembly believes legislator input is inappropriate, it could deem
the provision of such input an ethics violation. Rather than eliminate conflicts
of interest, the amendment embeds them in the process.
The General Assembly may lack the will to redistrict properly. It knows
what good non-gerrymandered redistricting looks like, as the VRC is charged
with engaging in such redistricting.215 The General Assembly can tap as much
expertise as it wants. It could engage experts to draw maps it could modify
or adopt. During the redistricting process in 2011, Governor McDonnell created the Independent Bipartisan Advisory Commission on Redistricting,
which made recommendations to the General Assembly.216 The General Assembly declined to enact those recommendations.217
The General Assembly could agree on maps that are fair, protect minority
voting rights, and honor other important redistricting principles if it desired.
Giving the map drawing duties to the VRC suggests members of the General
Assembly believe it should not be trusted with redistricting in 2021. The General Assembly’s attempted withdrawal from its responsibility to draw fair
electoral districts based on the fear that it will draw electoral maps improperly
is an easy way out, but it is not strictly necessary.
B. Do the VRC and Redistricting Legislation End Partisan
Gerrymandering?
The constitutional amendment and legislation limit partisan gerrymandering in multiple ways. The legislation limits partisan gerrymandering explicitly and implicitly.218 It explicitly limits partisan favoritism in redistricting in
its text and implicitly limits partisan favoritism by eliminating political
See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-392(G) (“Commissioners, staff of the Commission, and any other advisor or
consultant to the Commission shall not communicate with any person outside the Commission about matters related to reapportionment or redistricting outside of a public meeting or hearing. Written public comments submitted to the Commission, staff of the Commission, or any other advisor or consultant to the
Commission shall not be a violation of this subsection.”).
215 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04.
216 Va. Off. of the Governor, Executive Order No. 31 (Jan. 10, 2011); see also Micah Altman & Michael
P. McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles: Shifting from Rural Malapportionment to
Voting Rights to Public Participation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 771, 780, 792−94 (2013) (discussing history
of redistricting in Virginia including gubernatorial redistricting commissions).
217 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles: Shifting
from Rural Malapportionment to Voting Rights to Public Participation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 771, 780,
794−95 (2013).
218 § 24.2-304.04(4), (8).
214
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considerations from the communities of interest analysis.219 In combination,
those limitations, if taken seriously by the mapmakers, will eliminate partisan
gerrymandering from Virginia redistricting in 2021.220
The VRC’s structure guarantees it will not engage in explicit partisan gerrymandering. The VRC’s legislators will be half Democrats and half Republicans.221 The 75% supermajority requirement ensures that if Democrats are
unanimous, at least half of the Republicans and 75% of the citizen members
must agree on a map.222 Similarly, if the Republicans are unanimous, at least
half of the Democrats and 75% of the citizen members of the VRC must agree
on the map.223 The VRC’s voting rules suggest it will not pass an explicit
partisan gerrymander.
The supermajority requirement guarantees intentional partisan gerrymanders will not occur but may trigger other effects that might allow for the perpetuation of the effects of past partisan gerrymanders. At least three possible
outcomes could flow from the requirement: entrenchment of current districts, simplistic redistricting, or gridlock leading to the SCOVA redistricting.224
Entrenchment is possible if the status quo is the only basis for consensus
agreement. The VRC might decide a complete overhaul of districting is untenable and use current districts as a baseline. Starting with the current districts as the baseline will tend to entrench the current districts in place. If the
electoral districts are currently gerrymandered – as some of the supporters of
the constitutional amendment claim – or just poorly constructed, entrenchment continues the problem.225
Simplistic districting is possible and may sound reasonable. However,
such districting stems from the overemphasis of simple or easy to understand
redistricting criteria and may lead to unintended effects. For example, the
VRC could emphasize compact districts that respect jurisdictional boundaries as much as possible.226 That emphasis would create districts that are
219

§ 24.2-304.04(5).
See generally § 24.2-304.04.
221 VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(1) (noting half of the VRC’s legislative members will be chosen by the
party with the most members in the House and Senate and the other half chosen by the party with the
second most members in the House and Senate).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See id. § 6-A(b)(1), (f)−(g) (including a supermajority requirement and empowering SCOVA to draw
the maps if the commission is unable).
225 See generally The Problem, ONEVIRGINIA2021, https://www.onevirginia2021.org/the-problem/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2020) (arguing that both main political parties engage in gerrymandering).
226 See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(5)−(7); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences
220
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cohesive and would appear ungerrymandered. It could also lead to heavily
Democratic urban districts coupled with less heavily Republican suburban
and rural districts.227 That could create a set of districts that might provide
Democrats with less than proportional representation in the General Assembly and provide Republicans with more than proportional representation in
the General Assembly.228 The maps might be impervious to challenge on partisan grounds because the simplistic districting would not necessarily suggest
undue partisan favoritism. Nonetheless, the simplistic districting would provide a headwind for one political party that would act as an unintentional
mild partisan gerrymander.229 That might not be what voters thought they
ratified when they supported the constitutional amendment.
The supermajority requirement may trigger gridlock, which may lead to
the SCOVA redistricting. Gridlock does not require bad faith by the VRC
members. Presumably, the VRC members will be chosen for their experiences, their point of view, and their judgment. Refusing to agree to a map
that is not as favorable to one’s point of view as the map that the member
believes would otherwise be approved is not bad faith. Accepting gridlock to
push redistricting to the SCOVA does not necessarily suggest bad faith if one
believes the alternative would require accepting a map that would not be as
faithful to the requirements of Virginia law as the SCOVA’s maps. Republican members may be willing to force gridlock if they believe they would get
a better map from SCOVA than from the VRC. Democratic VRC members
presumably will compromise until they believe the VRC map they are asked
to approve is less favorable than the map they believe the SCOVA will draw.
None of this suggests the SCOVA will gerrymander; it will not. The legislation bars partisan gerrymandering; the SCOVA will follow the law.230
However, the SCOVA may engage in redistricting that is least likely to enmesh it in explicit political decision-making. That could suggest districting
using the status quo as a baseline, thereby entrenching gerrymandering in
new districts. Conversely, the SCOVA could choose simplistic districting
that may be easy but may not reflect the districting principles the General
of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 692 (2013) (describing potential unintended
effects of emphasizing jurisdictional boundaries or compactness).
227 See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 226, at 675, 706 (describing potential unintended effects of emphasizing jurisdictional boundaries or compactness); see also Altman & McDonald, supra note 216, at
828−30 (discussing history of redistricting in Virginia including gubernatorial redistricting commissions).
228 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 226, at 706 (“[C]ompact districts tend to pack Democrats and to result
in unfair and uncompetitive district plans.”).
229 See id. at 675 (asserting that underlying political geography can lead to districts with an unequal partisan effect, even absent partisan intent).
230 See § 24.2-304.04(8).
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Assembly – the people’s representatives – would prioritize. The special masters the SCOVA must use if it redistricts could move the SCOVA in a different direction.231 However, the special masters are unelected, and their advice
may not reflect the General Assembly’s prioritization of districting criteria.
C. Will the VRC and Redistricting Criteria Fully Protect Minority
Voting Rights?
The constitutional amendment and the redistricting criteria the General
Assembly passed are designed to protect minority voting rights.232 The redistricting criteria encourage the VRC to protect minority voting rights but do
not appear to require the VRC do so.233 The legislation bans intentionally
diminishing the ability of minority voters to elect their candidates of choice,
but it does not indicate whether the VRC must affirmatively increase the ability of minority voters to elect their candidates of choice.234 It hints at barring
retrogression but may not effectively do so.235 What the VRC can do and what
the VRC must do are different. The protection of minority voting rights depends on the VRC’s or the SCOVA’s inclination to protect minority voting
rights.
The VRC is unlikely to protect minority voting rights in the same manner
as the General Assembly. Six of eight legislators and six of eight citizenmembers must agree to a map.236 The legislator who is 3rd least protective of
minority voting rights or the citizen member who is the 3rd least protective of
minority voting rights on the VRC can veto a proposed plan. That takes the
protection of minority voting rights away from the median members of the
democratically elected General Assembly – who are likely in the Democratic
Caucus – and likely places it into the hands of the median members of the
Republican Party.
The issue is not whether Republicans are more hostile to minority voting
rights than Democrats, but how different groups are willing to use race in
redistricting. That depends on how the groups view race predominance and
how they prioritize minority voting rights among redistricting criteria.
231

See § 30-399(F).
Both do so explicitly. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(3)−(4).
233 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(3)−(4).
234 See § 24.2-304.04(3)−(4).
235 See id.; see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 138 (E.D. Va. 2018)
(noting non-retrogression requires jurisdiction to maintain number districts in which minority voters can
elect their candidate of choice).
236 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(d)(3).
232
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Republicans and Democrats will seek to avoid a finding of race predominance, because such a finding can trigger the judicial redrawing of districts.237
How groups prioritize minority voting rights will affect how maps are drawn.
Race predominance is problematic for mapmakers because it triggers strict
scrutiny, which is very difficult to survive.238 As noted in Part I, race predominance occurs when race subverts other redistricting principles.239 However,
the Supreme Court has not clarified precisely when race sufficiently subordinates other principles to trigger a finding of race predominance.240 Consequently, mapmakers must guess when race predominance has occurred.
Those who do not want to use race in redistricting may be more likely to
believe race has predominated whenever race is used in redistricting. They
may be willing to veto maps that use race sparingly, even if that use protects
minority voting rights. Those who believe race may need to be used to protect
minority voting rights will likely tolerate a more robust use of race before
determining race has predominated. If a dispute between such groups arises
and leads to gridlock, the SCOVA may resolve the issue when it redistricts.
Even if the members of the VRC agree race should be used to protect minority voting rights, members may disagree on how minority voting rights
should be prioritized. The Democratic Caucus in the General Assembly may
prioritize the protection of minority voting rights differently than the median
members of the Republican Party on the VRC. Those who argue this is not
an issue because the General Assembly’s 2020 legislation requires the VRC
prioritize and maximize minority voting rights because the legislation states
the VRC shall do so ignore the legislation’s requirement that the VRC shall
take each redistricting criterion into account when redistricting.241 Minority
voting rights – over and above what must be protected under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the VRA – are arguably no more privileged
than other redistricting criteria. Ironically, the legislation does not include a
rule of priority requiring adherence to specific criteria in the event of conflict
between redistricting criteria as the 2011 redistricting resolutions did.242 Neither side is necessarily correct regarding their prioritization of minority voting rights. However, those differing preferences may lead to gridlock and the
237

See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 885 (E.D. Va. 2019); Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F.Supp. 3d 522, 563 (E.D. Va. 2016).
238 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (“Strict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, strict.”); see also
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017) (“The burden thus shifts to the State to prove that its racebased sorting of voters serves a “compelling interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to that end.”).
239 See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90−91 (1996).
240 See Part I.B.
241 See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04 (prefacing each districting criteria with “shall”).
242 Compare § 24.2-304.04, with S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections, Comm. Res. No. 1 (Va. 2011).
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SCOVA redistricting.243
If SCOVA redistricts, the same concerns regarding the protection of minority voting rights arise. The SCOVA will not be hostile to minority voting
rights. However, they may prioritize the protection of minority voting rights
differently than the General Assembly. The result may be maps that differ
significantly from the maps the General Assembly would have drawn. If a
tradeoff between highly compact districts and districts that maximally protect
voting rights must be made, the VRC or the SCOVA might choose a different
tradeoff than the General Assembly would.
An example may be helpful. Currently, Virginia Congressional District 3
(CD3) is represented by Rep. Robert (Bobby) Scott and Congressional District 4 (CD4) is represented by Rep. A. Donald (Don) McEachin.244 Both
districts are crossover districts in the Richmond/Hampton Roads area.245 In
2012, the General Assembly declined to draw a congressional map that contained two crossover districts in the Richmond/Hampton Roads area.246 Instead, it drew a map with a single majority-minority district centered on Rep.
Scott’s district drawn in the prior redistricting cycle and used a 55% minimum BVAP to do so; litigation ensued.247 Consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in effect when the districts
were drawn in 2012, the litigation deconstructed the majority-minority CD3
to create a new CD3 and CD4 as crossover districts with Rep. McEachin
eventually representing CD4.248
The VRA has changed since the post-2010 Census redistricting.249 Section
5’s non-retrogression requirement no longer applies to Virginia, though

See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(g) (“If the General Assembly fails to adopt such a bill by this deadline,
the districts shall be established by the Supreme Court of Virginia.”).
244 Biography, CONGRESSMAN BOBBY SCOTT, https://bobbyscott.house.gov/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2021);
About Donald, CONGRESSMAN A. DONALD MCEACHIN, https://mceachin.house.gov/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2021).
245 See Mamie Locke, Time has come for fair districts, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Apr. 20, 2011),
https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/columns/article_d72128d5-16be-5e2d-afe9-4d0412d9059a.html
(discussing redistricting plan that included CD3 as an “influence district” and CD4 as a majority-minority
district in the Richmond/Hampton Roads area).
246 See S. 5004, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2011) (bill rejected); Locke, supra note 245.
247 See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 556–57 (E.D. Va. 2016); Andrew Cain, Judges
impose new Va. congressional map, redrawing 3rd, 4th Districts, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://richmond.com/news/local/government-politics/judges-impose-new-va-congressional-map-redrawing-3rd-4th-districts/article_0ad5053b-6818-5d7e-b96e-c9ce02ad45cb.html (discussing litigation).
248 About Donald, supra note 244.
249 See Part I.B.; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55,
55−56 (2013) (discussing changes Shelby County brought to section 2 and section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act).
243
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Section 2 does.250 The first question regarding the redistricting of CD3 and
CD4 should be whether Virginia must continue to draw the districts to avoid
a section 2 violation.251 If so, the mapmakers could decide to keep CD3 and
CD4 as they are because they appear to be lawful remedies for a continuing
potential section 2 violation. Conversely, the mapmakers could revert to the
old CD3 and draw a single majority-minority congressional district around
the minority voters who would help meet the first Gingles precondition – a
group of minority voters who would be a majority in a compact single-member district – then redistrict the rest of the area around that district.252
However, Virginia may no longer have a lurking section 2 violation regarding African American voters in Richmond/Hampton Roads with respect
to congressional redistricting.253 CD3 and CD4 are crossover districts with
African American congressmen who appear to be the representatives of
choice for the African American communities in the districts.254 The third
Gingles precondition – racial bloc voting that could defeat the minority voters’ representative of choice – is probably not met in the general area around
CD3 and CD4. Crossover districts involve a plurality of minority voters who
join with non-minority voters to elect the minority voters’ representative of
choice.255 Proving the existence of racial bloc voting that would generally
defeat the minority voters’ candidates of choice – Rep. Scott and Rep.
McEachin - in a context in which nonminority voters already join with African American voters to elect the minority group’s candidates of choice is
very difficult, if not impossible.256 If no section 2 violation exists, a mapmaker may be under no section 2 obligation to draw a majority-minority or a
250

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 249, at 55−62 (discussing application of section 2 and section 5 postShelby County).
251 See Noel H. Johnson, Resurrecting Retrogression: Will Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Revive Preclearance Nationwide?, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1−2 (2017). Congressional District Three
was originally drawn to remedy a potential section 2 violation. See also Altman & McDonald, supra note
216, at 789–90 (discussing the formation of the Third Congressional District).
252 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
253 See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 565 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing Abrams v. Johnson,
521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997)) (indicating a Section 2 challenge regarding CD4 would fail because of a lack of
racial bloc voting). That may not be true with respect to smaller electoral districts, e.g., House of Delegates
and state Senate districts. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act after Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2195−201 (2015) (discussing
how to identify differences in racial attitudes relevant to section 2 findings in subjurisdictions).
254 See Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 565 (citing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 276
(2014)) (discussing likelihood African American voters could elect their representative of choice in CD3
and CD4).
255 Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (defining a crossover district as one in which the minority
group can “elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority and
who cross over to support the minority's preferred candidate.”).
256 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1470 (2017).
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crossover district merely because one can be drawn.257
The mapmaker would remain obligated to draw districts consistent with
the legislative redistricting criteria.258 That would include considering minority voting rights but may not include keeping CD3 and CD4 as they are.259
Given incumbency protection and political cohesion are no longer a part of
the community of interest analysis, the mapmaker arguably should disregard
Rep. Scott’s nearly three decades of seniority that may serve Virginia and
Rep. Scott’s constituents well in Congress.260 If CD3 and CD4 arise organically based on redistricting principles embedded in the legislation, keeping
them as is might be required.261 If CD3 and CD4 are maintained explicitly
because they are crossover districts, race predominance – the subversion of
other redistricting criteria – may arise.
Alternatively, the VRC could focus primarily on creating compact districts
given the redistricting legislation’s increased emphasis on compactness and
the overarching belief that non-compact or ill-shaped districts are the hallmark of political gerrymandering.262 CD3 is relatively compact, but CD4 arguably is not especially compact.263 More importantly, other districts adjacent
to CD3 or CD4 do not appear to be compact. For example, CD5 – to the west
of CD4 – stretches from Washington, D.C.’s far suburbs to the North Carolina border.264 It should be redrawn to comply with compactness principles.
Redrawing it may affect voters in CD3 or CD4 or CD7 or all by causing the
mapmaker to shift land and voters into and out of each of those districts in a
manner that may make two reliable crossover districts in the Richmond/Hampton Roads area impossible. Those who support maximizing minority voting rights might create a map that looks quite different than the map
produced by those who prioritize minority voting rights differently.

257

See id. at 1472 (noting if Gingles preconditions are not met, state has no reason to believe it must draw
majority-minority district).
258 See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04.
259 See id.
260 See Biography, supra note 244.
261 See § 24.2-304.04; see also Altman & McDonald, supra note 216, at 786−88, 816−17.
262 For example, many Virginia commentators appear to believe oddly shaped districts are necessarily
gerrymandered. See, e.g., Stephen Nash & Mary Peyton Baskin, After the deal goes down: crooked alpacas replace Virginia democracy, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 12, 2017), https://richmond.com/opinion/columnists/stephen-nash-and-mary-peyton-baskin-after-the-deal-goes-down-crooked-alpacas-replace-virginia/article_05e0815d-39e7-5d2e-8877-a5dd6d1e38a2.html (disapproving of redistricting due
to the shape of districts); see also The Problem, supra note 225.
263 See Virginia, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/VA#map (last visited Sept. 19,
2020), for a map of CD3 and CD4.
264 See id. for a map of CD5.
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D. What Policy Issues Might the VRC or the SCOVA Address That the
General Assembly Should Resolve?
The discussion above involves policy decisions. Some policy decisions are
broad; some are granular. One broad decision involves whether the mapmaker should start from scratch or use the current districts as a starting point.
A granular issue relates to how to construct specific districts.
If Virginia’s electoral districts are gerrymandered and incumbency protection has been erased from the redistricting criteria, mapmakers arguably
should scrap the current districts and rebuild the electoral maps from scratch.
The mapmaker would eliminate gerrymandered and poorly constructed districts at one time. However, scrapping districts and starting over is a policy
issue the General Assembly should decide but has not yet decided. In the
wake of the amendment’s passage, the mapmaker – the VRC or the SCOVA
– will implicitly decide the issue as it redistricts.265
Where district lines are drawn are policy matters. Another example may
help. Henrico County wraps around the City of Richmond to the west, north,
and east.266 Given various conflicting districting principles, whether the east
end of Richmond should be in the same district with the east end of Henrico
County (with which it may share many racial, economic, cultural, and social
interests, and demographic similarities) or with the west end of Richmond
(with which it shares a jurisdiction, but with which it shares fewer economic,
cultural, and social interests, and less demographic similarity) is not clear.267
The question may not have a right answer, but the answer may be better given
by a politically accountable General Assembly than by a politically unaccountable VRC or SCOVA.
In 2021, the VRC or the SCOVA will redistrict General Assembly and
Congressional seats. They will do so making policy decisions that have not
been resolved by the General Assembly or the redistricting criteria. The General Assembly’s actions suggest it would prefer the VRC or the SCOVA
make these policy decisions. However, policy decisions regarding redistricting are policy decisions regarding governing that should usually be made by
the General Assembly. Giving that responsibility to the VRC or the SCOVA
may be characterized more as an abdication of duty than a thoughtful ceding
265

See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 6-A(a), (g) (placing responsibility for drawing district lines with the Virginia
Redistricting Commission or the Virginia Supreme Court).
266 See 2011 Magisterial Districts, HENRICO CNTY. (Aug. 2, 2011), https://henrico.us/pdfs/planning/maps/base.pdf (showing the Henrico County district boundaries surrounding the City of Richmond).
267 See Henry L. Chambers Jr., Is Race Legitimate Grounds for Drawing Districts?, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2010, at E5 (discussing hypothetical redistricting of Richmond and Henrico County).
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of power to an entity better able to exercise it.
CONCLUSION
By approving the constitutional amendment creating the VRC for a referendum, the General Assembly suggested the prior method of redistricting in
the Virginia Constitution was irretrievably broken. Undoubtedly, Virginia’s
post-2010 Census redistricting was problematic, with litigation keeping congressional districts uncertain until 2016 and House of Delegates districts uncertain until 2019.268 In the wake of that debacle, the General Assembly could
have reformed the General Assembly’s redistricting process. It could have
required transparency regarding the redistricting process and the input General Assembly members provide to influence the redistricting process. It
could have required the General Assembly use special masters to guide it
during the redistricting process. It could have forced itself to stand behind its
decisions. Those who supported the constitutional amendment might argue
the suggestions above have never been a part of the Virginia way of redistricting. That is why such simple changes would qualify as real redistricting
reform. Rather than fixing the redistricting system so it could discharge its
duty, the General Assembly abandoned its responsibility and gave its job to
a politically unaccountable entity.
This essay began by noting the dispute in the General Assembly regarding
the VRC is about minority voting rights and partisan gerrymandering; in part,
it is. However, it is also a dispute about redistricting policy and what entity
should make that policy while redistricting. Redistricting is about policy
choices and priorities. The constitutional amendment that creates the VRC
takes policy decisions away from the General Assembly and places them in
the VRC or the SCOVA.269 That may seem sensible, but the amendment’s
passage will likely create redistricting maps for the next decade with a different set of priorities than the General Assembly’s. Given the General Assembly is the elected manifestation of the people, that is a problem.

268

See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 555, 565 (E.D. Va. 2016) (adopting special master’s congressional redistricting changes); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872,
874 (E.D. Va. 2019) (adopting special master’s House of Delegates redistricting changes).
269 See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 6-A(a), (g).
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